On the other hand, China has maintained a 1996 secrecy regulation, which authorises China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to undertake unilateral activities involving transboundary deposits in disputed areas of the South China Sea. At the same time, China has adopted bilateral declarations and agreements that preclude the application of the rule of capture in both delimited and undelimited areas of the South China Sea. As for Philippine policy and practice, there is ambivalence towards the potential or actual presence of transboundary deposits.
A single petroleum deposit may traverse actual or potential boundaries on the continental shelf.
1 If one state drills on its side of the boundary, that state can capture the fluid and fugacious deposit, to the prejudice of the other states and the detriment of peaceful relations among them. 2 In enclosed or semi-enclosed seas where there can be multiple overlapping claims to the continental shelf, resort to the rule of capture is likely to happen. 3 One such semi-enclosed sea is the South China Sea where China, the Philippines and Vietnam are competing for the continental shelf.
In the United States, the rule of capture means that the 'owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands'. 4 The adjoining owners have no cause of action for injunction or recovery. 5 Their only recourse is to produce from offset wells drilled on their own lands. 6 In the international context, the rule of capture comes into play when a single reservoir rock containing petroleum is located across the continental shelf boundary of two or more states, any one of which can drill on its own continental shelf, perforate the reservoir rock and cause the petroleum to migrate to its side. 7 The rule of capture also operates in an undefined continental shelf boundary, such as when a claimant state 'proceeds with the unilateral exploitation of the whole area claimed, including overlapping areas', over the objection of the other claimant states.
In the past, petroleum exploration and exploitation in the South China Sea were confined to undisputed areas close to the shores. 8 However, since 1992, exploration by China and Vietnam has been inching towards disputed deep-water areas where a number of their exploration and licensing blocks now overlap. 9 The overlap has triggered protests and counter-protests between them. 10 Thus, this article asks: is the rule of capture countenanced in the South China Sea? What does international law provide? What do the policies and practices of China, the Philippines and Vietnam indicate? If the three states are poised to practise the rule of capture, there is bleak chance for peace in the South China Sea. However, if their policies and practices do not countenance the rule of capture, this represents a minimum standard of an acceptable and expected behaviour in the South China Sea.
This article consists of four parts, including this introduction. The second part considers whether the rule of capture is countenanced under international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). There is a debate among scholars on whether international law imposes:
The concluding part assesses the minimum consensus among the three countries on whether they have a substantive obligation to refrain from applying the rule of capture in the South China Sea and a procedural obligation to inform and negotiate.
International law and the rule of capture
Under UNCLOS, a coastal state has full territorial sovereignty over its territorial waters, 12 but it has only sovereign rights with respect to the continental shelf.
13 Sovereign rights give the coastal state functional jurisdiction to explore and exploit the natural resources on its seabed and subsoil.
14 These rights are inherent for the coastal state may exercise them without the need for prior proclamation or occupation of the continental shelf;
15 they are also exclusive for if the coastal state 'does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without [its] express consent'. 16 The only limitations to these rights are an existing maritime boundary 17 and the free status of the superjacent water and air space. 18 However, as Hurst noted, under the Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf, 19 the US expressed willingness to negotiate the delimitation of its continental shelf, but gave 'no indication of any willingness to discuss with another State any questions of what the United States may or may not do in connection with the resources of what it proclaims to be its Continental Shelf, or with the steps it takes for the purpose of winning these resources from the sea bed and the subsoil of the Continental Shelf'. 20 In other words, within its boundaries a coastal state can undertake any activity to win the deposit.
21
What about a transboundary petroleum deposit: can a coastal state apply the rule of capture and undertake any activity to win the deposit? To address this question, it is important to consider the ownership status of an offshore petroleum deposit in situ.
22
To recall, a coastal state has territorial sovereignty over its territorial sea but only sovereign rights or functional jurisdiction over its continental shelf. For Higgins, the difference is crucial for in the exercise of its territorial sovereignty a state can apply laws relating to the ownership of a deposit in situ in its territorial sea. 23 In contrast, in the exercise of sovereign rights or functional jurisdiction the state can apply only those laws that relate to activities for the exploration and exploitation of a deposit in situ on the continental shelf;
24 it cannot apply property laws reserving state ownership or allowing private ownership of the deposit. 25 A state that claims 'ownership of the natural resources in the subsoil of... the continental shelf area... exceed [s] its rights in international law '. 26 There are some who disagree with Higgins. Redgwell noted that UNCLOS is silent on the issue of title, 27 and because of this silence, '[i]n practice, a legal fiction is employed by most States which amounts to the assimilation of the continental shelf and land territory for jurisdictional purposes '. 28 This implies that it is 'up to the coastal state to exercise its sovereign rights with regard to ownership of the natural resources on its continental shelf'. 38 Thus, such state practice to refrain from applying the rule of capture and to negotiate is impelled by policy considerations rather than a conviction of joint ownership. 39 It would seem that Onorato and Lagoni differ mainly in their preferred mode of cooperation in the exploitation of the deposit. However, as stated earlier, this particular aspect of the debate is outside the scope of the present article.
Daintith also found no basis for treating a transboundary deposit as shared property. 40 In his view, in the context of their maritime boundary agreement, states maintain exclusive sovereign rights over their respective portions of the deposit. 41 However, unlike Lagoni, Daintith argued that, unless it gives its consent by way of a special agreement, a coastal state has no obligation to cooperate with the opposite or adjacent state. 42 Among those who hold this view, one group believes that said state cannot be restrained from undertaking unilateral activities, in the sense that if that state refuses to cooperate, it would not be deemed to have violated international law. 43 Another group argues that unilateral activities are not permissible for said state has an obligation to notify, consult and negotiate with the objective of reaching an agreement on the mode of apportionment of the deposit. 44 However, this second group acknowledges that said state would be justified to undertake unilateral activities if the other state unreasonably refuses to negotiate or cooperate. 45 Within this second group, some argue that the obligation to negotiate arises only in the context of 'an agreed boundary area where a known field straddles the boundary', 46 while others say that the obligation to negotiate arises from general international law, as interpreted in 41 Ibid. Perhaps adding to the uncertainty over the applicable international law is the decision of the International Law Commission that it 'should not take up the consideration of the transboundary oil and gas aspects of the topic [s]hared natural resources'. 50 The decision was made in light of objections to codification by majority of the delegations in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
51 Some of the delegations that objected to codification of an international law on transboundary oil and gas found no basis 'for the Commission to try to extrapolate customary international law, common principles or best practices from the divergent and sparse State practice in this area'.
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Set against such diverse views, the next part of this article turns to the offshore petroleum policies and practices of China, the Philippines and Vietnam to ascertain how they perceive their rights and obligations in regard to potential or actual transboundary deposits in the South China Sea.
Offshore petroleum regimes of China, the Philippines and Vietnam
Conflict has prevented the full survey of the South China Sea; 53 consequently, its potential in situ petroleum resources and recoverable reserves remain unknown. 54 There are estimates, but they vary widely, from the most optimistic estimates of 213,000 million barrels (Mb) of oil reserve and 57 These estimated recoverable reserves are found in nine hydrocarbon provinces, 58 which are either encompassed or traversed by the U-shaped maritime boundary line drawn by China, 59 although in the Song Hong basin, the U-shaped line is presumed to track an agreed maritime boundary between China and Vietnam.
60 For this reason it is possible for offshore petroleum deposits to traverse potential or actual boundaries in the South China Sea. 61 The succeeding sections discuss whether, in regard to such transboundary deposits, China, the Philippines and Vietnam consider the rule of capture permissible.
Recognition of coexisting interests in a transboundary deposit
This section examines the petroleum regimes of the three countries to determine whether they reserve ownership of the deposits in situ on their continental shelf and, at the same time, acknowledge that other states may have coexisting interests in the same deposits. It is important also to know whether they accept an obligation to notify and negotiate prior to undertaking exploration or exploitation activities. 74 The regulation was promulgated by the State Secrecy Bureau, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and CNOOC. 75 The regulation implies that, in regard to a potential or actual transboundary offshore deposit in a disputed area, China perceives no obligation to notify or consult with a competing state unless a legal procedure has been agreed upon. The recent deployment of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig in waters off the Paracel Islands is a case in point for these waters are not subject to any agreement with Vietnam, unlike the waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, which have been partially delimited.
76
The foregoing 1996 secrecy regulation is still valid even today. 'If any single petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or other mineral deposit of whatever character, extends across the delimitation line defined in Article II of this Agreement, the two Contracting Parties shall, through friendly consultations, reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure, field or deposit will be most effectively exploited as well as on the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from such exploitation.' 78 71 There are provisions relating to concession blocks that extend to another administrative unit within the territory of China (see Article VII is an acknowledgment by the parties that they have a coexisting interest in a petroleum deposit that straddles their boundary, and an obligation to consult in order to reach agreement on the effective exploitation of the deposit and its equitable apportionment. 79 The 1996 secrecy regulation is clearly incompatible with Article VII of the Gulf of Tonkin agreement.
Article VII is similar in tenor to the 'unity of deposit' clause in the 1965 maritime boundary agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway. 80 This 'unity of deposit' clause has been incorporated into almost every maritime boundary agreement 81 concluded after 1965, so much so that it now represents an authoritative international petroleum practice. 82 In 2006, pursuant to the terms of Article VII of the Gulf of Tonkin agreement, CNOOC, as the state corporation mandated to conduct the upstream offshore petroleum business of China, 83 and Vietnam Oil and Gas Group or PetroVietnam, as the national petroleum corporation of Vietnam, 84 entered into an Agreement on Joint Exploration in the Gulf of Tonkin.
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The agreement has since been amended to intensify 'exploration of the oil and gas composition that cuts cross the delimitation line' 86 in the Gulf of Tonkin. The agreement has also been reinforced by the adoption of basic 79 
Ibid. 80 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries, 10 March 1965, 551 UNTS 213. Article IV reads: 'If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single geological structure or field of any other mineral deposit, including sand or gravel, extends across the dividing line and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of the dividing line is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing line, the Contracting Parties shall, in consultation with the licensees, if any, seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure or field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the proceeds deriving therefrom shall be apportioned. 92 the three national oil companies will 'jointly collect 2D and 3D seismic data and process the existing 2D seismic data in the agreement area of over 140,000 square kilometers in the South China Sea', 93 without undermining 'the basic positions held by their respective Governments on the South China Sea issue'. 94 The JMSU fell through, for reasons to be discussed under the section on the Philippines. 95 Nonetheless, it is emphasised that unlike the 2006 joint exploration agreement between CNOOC and PVN, which pertains to a delimited area of the Gulf of Tonkin, the 2005 JMSU pertained to an area of the South China Sea, which had not been delimited. Nonetheless, the terms of the JMSU precluded the application of CNOOC's 1996 secrecy regulation to that disputed area.
It can be summed up that China claims state ownership of surface and underground petroleum resources on the continental shelf. 96 With respect to transboundary petroleum deposits in the disputed area in the South China Sea, the 1996 secrecy regulation promulgated by CNOOC indicates that China does not perceive an obligation towards other claimant states to refrain from unilateral exploration and exploitation or to notify and consult for the purpose of reaching an agreement on a mode of cooperation. However, China entered into bilateral agreements that override the 1996 secrecy regulation in the sense that, in both delimited and undelimited areas of the South China Seas, China acknowledged that other states may have a coexisting interest in a potential or actual transboundary deposit, and committed to cooperate in the survey or exploration of these areas. However, the implementing rules 99 of the Petroleum Law provide that the Vietnamese Government, which exercises state management over all petroleum activities, shall decide on 'issues related to cooperation in oil and gas activities in areas where overlappings with foreign countries occur'. 100 This provision of the implementing rules was later incorporated as Article 38 of the amended Petroleum Law of 2008.
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The amended Petroleum Law delegated to the Ministry of Industry and Trade 'the prime responsibility for submitting to the Prime Minister for approval… foreign cooperation schemes for oil and gas activities in overlapping areas with foreign countries' 102 and 'to carr y out international cooperation on oil and gas'. 109 and full title to the underlying mineral resources. 110 These claims apply to areas in the South China Sea, specifically the Kalayaan Group of Islands (a major portion of the Spratly Islands) 111 and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal).
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Unlike Vietnam, the Philippines has no law or regulation dealing with the potential or actual presence of petroleum deposits that straddle an agreed or disputed boundary on the continental shelf. Consequently, Philippine practice in bilateral agreements relating to transboundary deposits is not consistent. In 2005, PNOC signed a JMSU with an explicit caveat that 'the basic positions held by their respective governments on the South China Sea issue' will not be compromised. 113 PNOC was authorised to sign the JMSU under a Non-Exclusive Geophysical Permit purportedly issued by the Department of Energy. 114 In 2008, Philippine legislators questioned PNOC for entering into a JMSU without submitting the agreement to congressional approval, which, in the minds of these legislators, is a mandatory requirement, for the agreement was deemed no ordinary commercial contract, as its terms affected Philippine claims to sovereignty. 115 Moreover, the JMSU was perceived by the media as Is the Rule of CaptuRe CountenanCed In the south ChIna sea? a blunder, for the survey area covered portions of the Philippine territory, which were not being claimed by China or Vietnam. 116 It was feared that the JMSU covered concession areas that the Philippines had earlier awarded to NorAsia and Forum Energy, respectively. 117 In the wake of the controversy, PNOC let the JMSU expire in 2008.
118
At the time of expiration, the JMSU had generated regional 2D seismic data, which the parties were left to interpret individually. 119 Reacting to the Philippine decision not to extend the agreement, China declared 'it is regrettable that over recent years, the Philippines has changed its attitude and approach in handling the issue, gone back on its consensus with China'.
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The statement seems to imply that China considers the Philippine withdrawal from the JMSU a breach of the procedural requirement outlined in Guyana v Suriname.
In lieu of the JMSU, the Philippines proposed a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation or ZoPFFC. states would be to detect the presence of a viable resource that is either lying across disputed areas 123 or straddling a disputed area and an undisputed area.
124
The foregoing discussion indicates that, in its present state, the Philippine petroleum regime does not take into account the potential or actual existence of transboundary petroleum deposits in the South China Sea. Consequently, Philippine practice in bilateral negotiations and agreements, specifically its ZoPFFC proposal, is ambivalent to the idea that other states may have coexisting interests in a deposit that traverses a disputed or settled boundary in the South China Sea.
To summarise this section, China, the Philippines and Vietnam assert title to the mineral resources on their claimed continental shelf in the South China Sea. Under its 1996 secrecy regulation, China does not perceive an obligation to notify or cooperate with a neighbouring state in regard to a transboundary deposit in a disputed area of the South China Sea. However, through negotiated declarations and agreement affecting both delimited and undelimited areas in the South China Sea, China acknowledges the coexisting interest of other states in a potential or actual transboundary deposit and an obligation to cooperate. Vietnam unilaterally and bilaterally acknowledges the coexisting interest of other states in a transboundary deposit and an obligation to cooperate. The Philippine petroleum regime does not provide the legal infrastructure for recognition of or negotiation on the coexisting interests of other states in a transboundary petroleum deposit. There are past and ongoing attempts to negotiate on the issue, but these are currently labelled 'constitutionally impermissible'. 125 These attempts are discussed in the next section. The next section reviews the mechanisms that may enable China, the Philippines and Vietnam to cooperate in regard to a transboundary deposit. The focus is on the role of the national or state petroleum corporation within the mechanisms provided by their model contracts. The discussion will look more closely into the Philippine experience, although there will be preliminary discussions on the mechanisms available in China and Vietnam. The Philippine model contract recognises the concept of unitisation. The contractor can negotiate for unitisation in the event that an oil or gas field is found to extend beyond a contract area or when a non-commercial field can be made commercial by linking it to other fields, 149 provided the overall development plan is approved by the DOE. 150 However, as presently worded, the model contracts contemplate unitisation of a purely national scope.
To recapitulate, in its present state, the Philippine petroleum regime does not have the legal infrastructure to deal with the actual or potential presence of a transboundary petroleum deposit in the South China Sea.
vietnam
Compared to the Philippines, Vietnam has more extensive state practice in joint exploration/development and unitisation. To recall, in its own laws, Vietnam unilaterally subscribes to the idea of coexisting interests in transboundary resources. 151 In its 1992 memorandum of understanding with Malaysia, Vietnam committed to the joint exploration of a defined area where their claims overlap, and to cooperate if a petroleum field straddles the defined area and the continental shelf of either party. 152 Vietnam made similar commitments to Thailand, in their 1997 maritime boundary agreement, 153 and to China, in their 2004 Gulf of Tonkin agreement. 154 Prior to their 1992 memorandum of understanding, Vietnam and Malaysia had awarded overlapping blocks in the Gulf of Thailand.
155 In Vietnam's Block 46 Cai Nuoc, Petrofina had surveyed strong prospects, but it was the discoveries by Hamilton Oil Co in the adjoining Block PM-3 of Malaysia that encouraged the parties to come to an understanding. 156 Operators of PM-3 had found that the structure in Malaysia's Block PM-3 actually crosses into Vietnam's Block 46.
From mutual understanding with countries in dealing with a transboundary petroleum deposit, Vietnam progressed to actual joint exploration and international unitisation, and it kept apace by adopting mechanisms for cooperation. These mechanisms, as enumerated in its 2012 Law of the Sea, included not only international treaties 158 but also 'contracts signed in accordance with the provisions of Vietnamese legislation or with the permission of the Vietnamese Government'. 159 As earlier discussed, Vietnam has employed state-to-state negotiations to forge cooperation with Malaysia, Thailand and China in the South China Sea. 160 However, the more dynamic mechanisms currently available to it are petroleum contracts involving PetroVietnam as 'a state company having the function of signing and supervising the performance of petroleum contracts with foreign countries'. 161 The forgoing provision on international unitisation is a significant shift in policy for in the 2005 model contract -which Vietnam had previously applied -the provisions on unitisation did not contemplate the possibility of cross-border cooperation, 163 much less cooperation initiated by an operator. Moreover, the language of the 2013 model contract makes negotiation towards transboundary cooperation obligatory and spontaneous on the part of Vietnam. Such mechanism is a clear departure from the outcome in RSM Is the Rule of CaptuRe CountenanCed In the south ChIna sea?
v Grenada wherein operators were declared without authority, personality and cause to involve themselves in a maritime dispute between two states. 164 The 2013 model contract is remarkable in its flexibility and liberality, especially when set in the context of a volatile South China Sea. For one, Vietnam authorises its operator to negotiate with the adjoining or opposite operator the terms of a unitisation agreement, subject only to the approval of the management committee. Technically, the Government of Vietnam will involve itself only at the stage of approval of the terms of the agreement, although it may be argued that the equal participation of PetroVietnam in the management committee 165 would mean that the government shall be informed and consulted every step of the way. More than that, the right of the contractor and management committee to negotiate and adopt an international unitisation agreement is enforceable by arbitration under paragraph 15.1.2. Undoubtedly, this international unitisation provision in the 2013 model contract provides Vietnam with the necessary and efficient mechanism to deal with a potential or actual transboundary deposit in the South China Sea. has demonstrated a preference for the private sector or semi-private sector mechanism of cooperation in the South China Sea. To sum up this section, in Vietnam there are legal mechanisms that easily facilitate cross-border unitisation and joint exploration or development. No such legal mechanisms can be found in the petroleum regime of China and the Philippines. However, CNOOC itself has the authority and flexibility to forge cross-border cooperation following bilateral or corporate negotiations. China has called upon the Philippines to give similar authority to PNOC or to the private sector, but the Philippines has not acted in this direction.
Conclusion
The potential or actual presence of transboundary petroleum deposits across defined and undefined boundaries makes for a volatile situation in the South China Sea. The principle of sovereign rights under international law aggravates, rather than regulates, the situation, for if pursued to its logical end, the principle countenances the rule of capture in the international context. This article posed the question whether China, the Philippines and Vietnam apply or are poised to apply the rule of capture in the South China Sea. It analysed the natural resource and petroleum regimes and bilateral agreements and undertakings of the three countries, for in these instruments the three countries formally define their rights and obligations in regard to a transboundary petroleum deposit in the South China Sea. Based on these instruments, China and Vietnam acknowledge the potential or actual presence of a transboundary petroleum deposit across their defined or undefined boundaries. Vietnam unilaterally and bilaterally expresses this acknowledgment in law, regulation, contract and agreement. China expresses this acknowledgment in bilateral agreements and undertakings. However, China has a subsisting secrecy regulation, which authorises CNOOC to withhold information relating to transboundary deposits in disputed areas in the South China Sea that are not governed by any bilateral agreement or declaration. Meanwhile, the Philippines has not defined its policy on the potential or actual presence of transboundary petroleum deposits or on the status of these deposits.
Furthermore, Vietnam installed in its petroleum law and model contract mechanisms by which cooperation in regard to a transboundary petroleum deposit is easily facilitated. China has no similar legal mechanism, but it equipped CNOOC with a level of corporate autonomy to forge such cooperation. The Philippines has no similar mechanism for it has clipped the authority of PNOC.
It might be concluded that, in relation to potential or actual transboundary petroleum deposits in the South China Sea, Vietnam clearly and absolutely does not countenance the application of the rule of capture. China has maintained its 1996 secrecy regulation in regard to discoveries and activities involving transboundary deposits; however, it has also adopted bilateral declarations and agreements that preclude the application of the rule of capture. The Philippines has yet to make up its mind.
